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We study the interplay of inequality and trust in a dynamic game, in which trust increases 
efficiency and thus allows higher growth of the experimental economy in the future. We find 
that trust is initially high in a treatment starting with equal endowments, but decreases over 
time. In a treatment with unequal endowments, trust is initially lower yet remains relatively 
stable. The difference seems partly due to the fact that equal starting positions increase 
subjects’ inclination to condition their trust decisions on wealth comparisons, whereas 
conditional trust is much less prevalent with unequal initial endowments. As a result, with 
respect to efficiency, the initially more unequal economy fares worse in the short run but 
better in the long run, and the disparity of wealth distributions across economies mitigates 
over time. 
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Trust makes economic agents more willing to engage in interactions involving
the risk of being deceived. Thus, serving as a “lubricant”, trust may posi-
tively inﬂuence eﬃciency and economic growth, and at the same time aﬀect
the distribution of wealth within an economy (see Section II for related lit-
erature). However, trust is diﬃcult to measure both on the microeconomic
and the macroeconomic level. Survey data frequently discover individual
attitudes towards trust, but cannot easily identify to what extent such self-
reported attitudes reﬂect actual economic behavior, and how trust interacts
with the dynamics of eﬃciency and distribution. Furthermore, the causal
relationship between trust and economic variables is not always clear, as
argued by Durlauf (2002), who thus advocates the use of laboratory stud-
ies. This paper follows Durlauf’s advice. It complements the empirical and
survey literature on the relationship between inequality and trust with the
help of experiments, which systematically investigate the dynamic interplay
of trust, eﬃciency and distribution.
The working horse of our experiment is a variant of the trust game
introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). In this game, a trustor
can send an amount of money to an anonymous trustee. Before received
by the trustee, the amount sent is multiplied by a factor greater than one,
and thus yields eﬃciency gains. Subsequently, the trustee decides on how
much of the amount received she sends back to the trustor. The amount
sent can be interpreted as a measure of trust, while the amount returned
measures the degree of trustworthiness.1 In our experiment, participants
start with an unequal or equal distribution of initial endowments within
a group. In each of several rounds they play a trust game with a new
anonymous partner. Round payoﬀs are immediately added to endowments,
and therefore determine the amount that can be exchanged in future rounds.
That is, trust and trustworthiness jointly aﬀect the current and potential
1The game is sometimes called ‘investment game’, and the amount sent is interpreted
as a measure for investment in risky projects. In this paper both interpretations ﬁt equally
well.
2future growth rates of the economy, as well as the evolution of economic
inequality.2
In the experiments, we observe that initial trust levels are lower in a
treatment starting with unequal endowments (IEQ) compared to a treat-
ment with equal endowments (EQ). However, in EQ trust behavior is strongly
conditioned on wealth information, while this is not the case in IEQ. We sus-
pect that this is partly due to the fact that, in IEQ, subjects cannot easily
distinguish between exogenously and endogenously created wealth diﬀer-
ences. As a result, investment rates decrease steadily and strongly over
time in the initially equal experimental economies, yet remain rather stable
in the treatment starting with unequal endowments. The wealth distribu-
tions across treatments converge to each other. However, wealth inequality
in treatment EQ rises faster than implied by the randomness of market in-
teractions, while income shifts towards the relative poor in treatment IEQ
seem not based on deliberate distributional concerns.
In Section II we review the literature related to our experiment. Sec-
tion III speciﬁes the details of our experimental design and procedures, and
sketches hypotheses based on previous empirical results and economic mod-
els. Our experimental data and statistical analysis are presented in Sec-
tion IV. We discuss our results and conclude in Section V.
II Related Literature
There is a broad theoretical and empirical literature dealing with the in-
terplay of inequality with economic growth and prosperity. The academic
discussion started in the 1950s with the Kuznets-Curve (Kuznets, 1955),
which proposed a relation between inequality and economic development in
the form of an inverted U. More recently, it is predominantly assumed that
the relation between inequality and growth is a negative one. Examples of
the theoretical literature include the models of Galor and Zeira (1993), Pers-
son and Tabellini (1994), and, surveying the diﬀering strains of literature,
2Given that investments yield constant positive returns, the dynamic game allows
initially rich subjects to increase their endowments much more in absolute terms than
initially poor subjects.
3Ros (2000) and Glaeser (2005). B´ enabou (1996) gives an overview about
a number of empirical studies, the majority of which ﬁnd a negative link
between income disparity and growth.3
Some authors have argued that trust is the key for understanding the
negative relationship between inequality and economic prosperity. Inequal-
ity decreases the level of trust and trustworthiness in a society, which in
turn negatively aﬀects growth. Empirical evidence is provided by Knack
and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001), who found that countries
with higher income dispersion (measured by the Gini coeﬃcient for income)
exhibit signiﬁcantly lower values for a trust measure derived from the World
Value Surveys (WVS).4 Similarly, Alesina and Ferrara (2002) ﬁnd a neg-
ative connection between social distance and trusting behavior in a study
restricted to the United States. Furthermore, some empirical studies could
establish a positive impact of generalized trust on economic development
(Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,
1997; Zak and Knack, 2001).
Other authors see social preferences, speciﬁcally concerns for social sta-
tus,as the relevant link between inequality and economic development, as
these might discourage both poor and rich subjects to accumulate income
in an unequal society and lower the political will for redistribution (Corneo
and Gr¨ uner, 2000; Corneo and Jeanne, 2001).
Durlauf (2002), however, notes that there are various problems of causal-
ity and identiﬁcation in many of these empirical studies on the relationship
between social capital, trust and economic indexes. He thus proposes the use
of laboratory experiments to investigate the causal structure between these
measures. Results from such economic experiments allow to build models
of individual behavior to explain the relationship between social capital and
3However, there are also some studies, such as Forbes (2000), which question this view
and suggest a positive relation instead.
4The World Values Surveys are repeated interview studies with representative popu-
lation samples on the changes in moral values and beliefs, conducted in 80 countries all
over the world since 1981. One question is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you can‘t be too careful in dealing with people?”. The
percentage of positive responses is used as a measure of generalized trust in a country.
4economic measures on the aggregate (see, for example, the model of Glaeser,
Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002).
There is experimental evidence on the relationship of cooperation and
inequality in public goods games, which share a couple of features with the
trust game studied here. The evidence is, however, mixed. In a survey on
repeated public goods games with complete information, Ledyard (1995)
comes to the conclusion that economic heterogeneity among subjects gen-
erally lowers cooperation levels. Chan, Mestelman, Moir and Muller (1996)
ﬁnd that poor subjects contribute more to a public good than rich sub-
jects. Buckley and Croson (2006) conduct a linear public good game with
heterogenous endowments of the subjects. In their study, rich and poor
subjects contribute on average the same absolute amount to a public good.
Thus, as poor subjects contribute a higher share of their respective endow-
ments, economic inequality increases within the experimental groups.
Other studies are devoted to the relationship between social distance
(measured on various scales) and investment behavior in the trust game in-
troduced by Berg et al. (1995). Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter
(2000) combined questionnaires on social backgrounds and trust attitudes
with an experimental trust game. In their experiment, subjects interact-
ing face-to-face with a partner of a diﬀerent race or nationality exhibited
a lower level of trustworthiness. In addition, a higher social status of the
sender seems to be positively related to the earnings of a trusting decision.
Hence, the results of this study indicate detrimental eﬀects of social dis-
tance. However, survey measures of generalized trust were not found to be
correlated with actual trusting behavior. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) ﬁnd
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent degrees of trust towards diﬀerent ethnical groups in the
Israeli-Jewish society, although these groups did not diﬀer concerning their
trustworthiness. In a recent study, Haile, Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) con-
ducted a trust game experiment with South-African students. They found
negative eﬀects of socio-economic diﬀerences, as low-income subjects trusted
less when confronted with a high-income transaction partner from another
ethnic group.
5To our knowledge, there are only two experiments which speciﬁcally
study the role of payoﬀ inequality in the trust game. Contrary to the stud-
ies discussed above, social distance is induced by the experimental design.
Br¨ ulhart and Usunier (2007) varied endowments of the trustees, which how-
ever did not aﬀect trust. Anderson, Mellor and Milyo (2006) employed an
equal as well as a symmetric and a skewed unequal distribution of show-up
fees in a trust game. The distribution of show-ups was either private or
public information. The authors observe only small and inconsistent eﬀects
of unequal endowments on trusting behavior.
III Experimental design and hypotheses
In our study, we focus on the dynamic interaction of trust and inequality.
Therefore, we added a couple of modiﬁcations to the original trust game
introduced by Berg et al. (1995). First of all, the game is played over 20
rounds. In each round, two randomly and anonymously matched subjects
play the trust game. One of the subjects is randomly assigned the role of
the trustor, the other the role of a trustee. Before decisions are made, each
subject is informed about his own and the opponent’s wealth in the current
round. Wealth is deﬁned as the initial endowment plus any payoﬀs that have
been accumulated in earlier rounds. A player’s wealth limits the amounts
that he can send or return in the current round of the dynamic trust game
in the following way. The trustor decides on an amount S, which is not
allowed to exceed his current wealth, to be sent to the trustee. Any amount
sent is multiplied by the factor 1.2, i.e. the trustee receives 1.2S. Next, the
trustee can decide on the amount R to be sent back to the trustor. The
minimum amount to be returned is 0.9S, or 90% of the amount sent.5 The
upper limit is given by the sum of the current wealth of the trustee plus the
received amount. Because payoﬀs are accumulated during the course of the
repeated trust game, our experimental economies could maximally grow by
an expected factor of 6.2.6
5These restrictions make the one-round interaction in our game equivalent to the origi-
nal trust game interaction with a sent amount multiplier of three, with the exception that
the amount that can be sent is restricted to 10% of the trustor’s wealth.
6As in each round only half of the subjects in the economy are randomly assigned
to the role of the trustor, the expected maximum growth rate over 20 rounds with full
6We varied the distribution of the initial endowments across our two treat-
ments. Under the equality condition (EQ), all subjects were endowed with
an amount of 500 ET (Experiment Talers) before the ﬁrst round. In the
inequality treatment (IEQ), half of the subjects in each matching group
received 200 ET, and the other half received 800 ET.
The experimental sessions took place in May 2005 in the Cologne Lab-
oratory for Economic Research. We conducted four sessions, two for each
of our treatments. To allow for experience and to test robustness of behav-
ior, after the ﬁrst 20 rounds of the experiment we restarted the game for
another 20 rounds. Subjects were told before the session that the experi-
ment consisted of several runs, one of which would be randomly selected for
payoﬀ.
Subjects were recruited using the Online Recruitment System by Greiner
(2004). Altogether 128 student subjects participated, most of them with a
major in Economics, Business Administration or related ﬁelds. Each session
consisted of 32 participants. Random matching per round was restricted to
groups of 8 participants.7 It was publicly known that two subjects would
never interact with each other in consecutive rounds. Due to this procedure,
we collected observations on 8 statistically independent ‘economies’ for each
treatment. Overall, we collected 2,560 choices for each player role.
The experiment was computerized using the zTree software (Fischbacher,
2007). After subjects arrived and were randomly assigned to a cubicle, in-
structions were distributed.8 Questions were answered privately. At the end
of the experiment subjects ﬁlled in a post-experimental questionnaire ask-
ing for demographical data and containing open questions for motivations
of subjects’ decisions. Finally, either run 1 or run 2 was selected for payoﬀ
by publicly rolling a die. Participants were paid out privately and left the
laboratory. The exchange rate was ﬁxed at 150 ET = 1 Euro. The average
payoﬀ was 12.25 Euros (including a show-up fee of 2.50 Euros) with a stan-
investments corresponds to 1.2
10.
7Subjects were not informed that the matching procedure was restricted in such a way,
conveying the impression that being matched with the same opponent more than once is
very unlikely.
8Instructions are included in the appendix.
7dard deviation of 5.09 Euros. Each session lasted approximately one and a
half hours.
The standard game theoretic prediction is trivial. Because of the ﬁnite-
ness of the game, there is no trust and no trustworthiness among selﬁsh and
rational players if selﬁshness and rationality are common knowledge. How-
ever, starting with Berg et al. (1995), numerous experiments have shown
that subjects are willing to send and return non-trivial amounts of money
in the trust game. For a survey of the trust game literature see, for example,
Camerer (2003).
While the experimental one-shot version of the trust game is by now well-
analyzed and -understood, the dynamic interplay of inequality and trust is
not easily predicted. However, observe that both of our treatments start
with identical average endowments. If inequality does not aﬀect subjects’
willingness to send and return money, relative to their endowments, the
two treatments may be expected to yield equivalent results with respect to
growth rates.9 On the other hand, the empirical and experimental literature
on social and economic heterogeneity cited in Section II suggests that we may
observe a negative impact of inequality on trust in our setting. Dispersion
of wealth could increase social distance between economic agents and, as a
result, trust and trustworthiness may decrease. To the extent our experiment
captures some of the underlying mechanisms assumed in this literature, we
should expect less growth and lower eﬃciency in treatment IEQ.
Finally, we note that theories of social preferences can organize some
of the deviations from standard equilibrium behavior observed in the trust
game. For instance, inequity aversion models (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) can explain both trust and trustworthiness in the
trust game by assuming that selﬁshness and fairness motives interact within
and between subjects.10 However, these models do not yield unambiguous
9In the beginning of the ﬁrst run, the average endowment of trustors in treatment EQ
is equal to 500, as it is in treatment IEQ. Thus, if the same share is sent and returned,
expected overall invested amounts are the same, as well as the amounts returned. There-
fore, the expected endowments of trustors in round 2 are the same in both treatments.
The same reasoning applies to all consecutive rounds of the game.
10See Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), page 187, for a detailed description of the mechanics
8comparative static predictions across our two treatments. To see why, ob-
serve for instance that a rather fair-minded trustor who is matched with a
relatively poor trustee may send money to equalize payoﬀs, while a rather
selﬁsh trustor may not send money because he cannot expect to get any-
thing back from a relatively poor opponent. Thus, the predictions of in-
equity aversion models will depend on the distribution of preferences. It
appears, though, that ’myopic’, straightforward concerns for equal payoﬀs
lead to more trust and trustworthiness in IEQ in the following sense: Even
when an inequality averse subject assumes that everybody else behaves in
a completely selﬁsh manner, he still has reason to trust and to be trustwor-
thy towards relatively poor opponents in the inequality treatment (where,
in the beginning of round 1, the payoﬀ distribution is unfair), but no such
incentive exists in the equality treatment (where the payoﬀ distribution is
fair if everybody behaves selﬁshly).
IV Experimental Results
IV.1 Aggregate Data
Figures 1 and 2 depict the evolution of averages of send and return rates
over time. We deﬁne the ’send rate’ in a particular round as the share of the
trustor’s wealth in this round that she invests in the transaction. The ’return
rate’ is deﬁned as the amount returned minus the mandatory 90% (R−0.9S),
divided by the amount received minus the mandatory 90% (1.2S − 0.9S).
For example, a return rate of 1/3 implies that the trustee returns exactly
the amount invested by the trustor. (The dashed horizontal line in Fig-
ure 2 indicates this ‘break-even line’.) For ﬁgures and non-parametrical
tests the send rate averages are calculated by adding up all amounts sent in
a matching group, and dividing the sum by the total wealth of the senders.11
of the fairness models in the context of Berg et al. (1995)’s trust game.
11This procedure creates a weighted measure for the trust level, which seems appropriate
since here our focus lies on aggregate behavior. However, our conclusions from statistical
tests do not depend would not be diﬀerent, if unweighted averages would be used.
9FIGURE 1
Average Send Rates over Rounds
Figure 1 shows that the dynamics of trust diﬀer markedly between the
treatments. In the ﬁrst round of the games, the equal distribution of wealth
leads to higher trust (54% more, to be exact) than the unequal distribu-
tion.12 This ﬁnding is in line with previous empirical ﬁndings and theoretical
work suggesting that inequality hampers eﬃciency.
However, send rates in treatment EQ strongly and steadily decrease over
time from 68% in round 1 to 20% in round 20 in run 1, and from 77% to
15% in run 2, while send rates in IEQ increase slightly in run 1 and de-
crease slightly in run 2. Correspondingly, in EQ average send rates of the
matching groups are signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated to the number of
rounds (Pearson-R=-.586, p = .000 and Pearson-R=-.394, p = .000 for run 1
and 2, respectively) while this is not (strongly) so in IEQ (Pearson-R=.061,
p = .442 and Pearson-R=-.154, p = .051 for run 1 and 2, respectively).13
12One-sided Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) tests applied to (statistically still independent)
individual send rates and to respective matching group data in round 1 all yield p < 0.1.
The reason for the low signiﬁcance of these between-treatment tests lies in the signiﬁcant
heterogeneity of subjects in treatment IEQ. Speciﬁcally, poor subjects send absolutely less
than EQ subjects (p < 0.01), but not relatively, while rich subjects send relatively less
(p < 0.05), but not absolutely. Our analysis of individual behavior in the next subsection
controls for these wealth eﬀects.
13A similar conclusion is reached when applying Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Ranks
10FIGURE 2
Average Return Rates over Rounds
Diﬀerences in the return rates, visualized in Figure 2, are generally less
pronounced than diﬀerences in the send rates. However, average return
rates in the ﬁrst run are signiﬁcantly lower in treatment EQ than in treat-
ment IEQ (a one sided MWU test applied to independent matching group
averages yields p = .007). The diﬀerences in run 2 are not statistically
signiﬁcant. A look at the individual data reveals higher average trustwor-
thiness in treatment IEQ: The share of responders with an average return
rate of more than 1/3 in run 1 is 56.3% in treatment IEQ and only 34.4% in
treatment EQ (p = .021, two-sided χ2-test). Thus, from a trustor‘s point of
view, the overall probability that a trusting decision is proﬁtable is higher
in IEQ. Diﬀerences in run 2 with 57.8% for IEQ and 45.3% for EQ are again
existent, but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p = .216, two-sided χ2-test).
In contrast to the evolution of send rates, average return rates appear
to be relatively stable over time. In neither treatment there is a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and second half of a run (Wilcoxon Matched
(WMPSR) tests to averages per matching group or to individual averages for the ﬁrst and
the second half of each run, respectively.
11Pairs Signed Ranks test, p > 0.1 for all tests). However, the fact that return
rates tend to go down in the last few rounds, especially in run 2, suggests
that subjects exhibit an end-game eﬀect.
FIGURE 3
Average Total Economy Wealth over Rounds
The diﬀerent dynamics in trust are reﬂected in the growth rates of over-
all wealth in our experimental economies. Recall that more trust directly
expands overall wealth in our experimental design, because the latter is a
cumulative measure of the former. Figure 3 depicts average economy wealth
over time. There are substantial eﬃciency gains in both treatments and
runs, with total average wealth more than doubling in all runs of both
treatments. Initially, wealth in treatment IEQ lags behind the one in treat-
ment EQ. However, as average send rates remain on a relatively high level
in treatment IEQ and decrease in treatment EQ, the lag is eventually coun-
terbalanced and reversed in the last few rounds. In run 2 we do not observe
large initial diﬀerences, and after the ﬁrst few rounds treatment EQ lags be-
hind indelibly. Accumulated wealth in IEQ ﬁnally accounts for more than
300 % of initial endowments.
Not only eﬃciency gains but also the distributions of wealth in our ex-
perimental economies evolve endogenously through sending and returning
12FIGURE 4
Observed and Simulated Gini Coefficients over Rounds
decisions. We use Gini coeﬃcients to analyze the dispersion of individual
wealth levels.14 Figure 4 depicts average matching group Gini coeﬃcients
in treatments EQ and IEQ (solid lines). We observe that Gini coeﬃcients
strongly and steadily decrease (increase) in treatment IEQ (EQ), and tend
to converge to each other towards the end of a run. In the last round of a
run, IEQ and EQ Ginis are not or only weakly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (MWU,
p = .462 and p = .093 for run 1 and 2, respectively).
Redistribution in our setting might have two diﬀerent sources: on the
one hand, it could be the result of random, homogenous interaction, in the
sense that rates are not conditioned on individual wealth states or wealth
comparisons. Because, given the rates, richer subjects send more in absolute
terms than poorer subjects, such behavior moves the economy towards more
equality when starting with unequal endowments. On the other hand, redis-
tribution could be the result of rates which systematically depend on others’
14The Gini coeﬃcient as a measure for disparity takes the value of zero if the income
is equally distributed among the subjects and (n − 1)/n if all wealth is concentrated on
only one subject. Here, the maximum value of the Gini coeeﬁcient accounts for 7/8, as
the number of subjects per matching group is n = 8).
13wealth or on own wealth in the current state. Depending on the nature of
conditional behavior and the heterogeneity of the behavioral patterns, the
resulting system behavior may increase or decrease equality relative to what
can be expected from unconditional homogenous interaction.
In order to isolate the eﬀects of these two mechanisms, we simulate Gini
coeﬃcients for unconditional, homogenous behavior. More speciﬁcally, sim-
ulations are based on the same role and group matchings as implemented
in our experiment. Furthermore, we assume that in every round all partic-
ipants in a matching group behave identical – like the group average.15 If
actual behavior is unconditional with respect to wealth levels and diﬀerences,
simulations and actual behavior cannot diﬀer. If behavior is conditional on
these factors, the actual system deviates from the simulated system.
Moreover, we use the same growth rates as realized in each respective
round to calculate the evolution of the income distribution separately for all
experimental groups.
The simulated Gini coeﬃcients (see the dotted lines in Figure 4) follow
the same general pattern as the observed ones. In treatment IEQ, simulated
and observed Ginis curves are nearly the same (run 1) or diﬀer only slightly
(run 2). Consequently we ﬁnd no diﬀerences between round 20 observation
and simulation values (WMPSR, p = .674 and p = .327 for run 1 and 2,
respectively). In treatment EQ, observed values are constantly higher than
the simulated values, yielding (weakly) signiﬁcant diﬀerences of ﬁnal values
(WMPSR, p = .025 and p = .093 for run 1 and 2, respectively).
Thus, on the aggregate level, we ﬁnd no evidence for systematic and
deliberate redistributive behavior from rich to poor in treatment IEQ. Con-
trary, inequality rises faster than expected in treatment EQ, suggesting that
there are indeed heterogeneous behavioral patterns that systematically af-
fect wealth distribution.
15This procedure yields the same individual economy growth rates in the simulation as
in the experiment.
14IV.2 Individual Decisions
We regressed the individual send and return rates on a number of inde-
pendent variables. First, we use the Round number (1-20), and create two
dummies for Treatment (0 for EQ, 1 for IEQ) and Run (0 for 1st, 1 for 2nd
run). We also include the relative wealth standing of the sender (WSDR) and
the responder (WRSPR) prior to the transaction. Both variables are derived
by dividing the respective decision maker’s wealth by the average wealth in
her economy (matching group). For the regression on the return rate we
include the send rate of the counterpart. To account for group-speciﬁc as
well as for subject-individual characteristics, we use Mixed Eﬀects models.
Due to the rather complex dynamic nature of our game, we cannot exclude
any interaction eﬀects between the independent variables. We approach the
selection problem in the following way: in our main regressions, we start
with the full factorial set of potential interaction eﬀects. We then itera-
tively throw out insigniﬁcant eﬀects. After two iterations we ended up with
the models presented in Table 1. Note that, by construction, all included
interactions eﬀects are signiﬁcant. As a second approach we ran regressions
on the 2-factorial set of interaction factors. The results are presented in
Table 2 in the Appendix and basically conﬁrm the analyses shown here.
The model for sender decisions, presented in Table 1, reveals important
diﬀerences in the role of relative wealth variables between the treatments.16
Wealth positions inﬂuence trusting behavior in treatment EQ, but are of
minor importance for trustors in treatment IEQ. In treatment EQ, the eﬀect
of both direct wealth variables is negative. That is, participants send less
the richer they are and the richer the responder is. However, the positive
interaction eﬀect indicates that the more equal sender and responder are,
the less pronounced are the wealth eﬀects. The lowest send rates are found
for poor senders towards rich responders and for rich senders towards poor
responders. Contrary, in treatment IEQ all these three eﬀects are largely
neutralized. It seems that here wealth of the sender or responder play only a
16We had to exclude 6 and 314 observations in the models on the send rate and return
rate, respectively, because the send rate is only deﬁned for positive wealth of the sender,
and the return rate is only deﬁned for positive amounts sent.
15TABLE 1
Regressions of individual send and return rates
Dependent Variable Send Rate Return Rate
Coeﬃcients (Std.Error) Coeﬃcients (Std.Error)
Round -0.017** (0.001) -0.005** (0.001)
WSDR -0.950** (0.152) -0.080** (0.023)
WRSPR -0.922** (0.145) 0.029 (0.030)
WSDR ∗ WRSPR 0.662** (0.142)




Treatment*WSDR ∗ WRSPR -0.631** (0.147)
Run 0.036** (0.011) 0.016 (0.033)
Run*WSDR -0.077* (0.038)
Run*WSDR ∗ WRSPR 0.063* (0.027)
Send rate 0.154** (0.015)
Constant 1.866** (0.173) 0.275** (0.050)
Random Eﬀects
Group StdDev 0.186 (0.045) 0.0001
Subject StdDev 0.264 (0.019) 0.174 (0.013)
Residual StdDev 0.272 (0.004) 0.246 (0.004)
No. of obs. 2554 2246
Wald χ2 305.10 249.81
Log-restricted likelihood -529.993 -207.612
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * and ** denote signiﬁcance on the 5% and 1%-level,
respectively. Regression models are derived by starting with a full factorial set of interaction
eﬀects and iteratively throwing out insigniﬁcant eﬀects.
very minor role for decisions on send rates. These observations are consistent
with the simulation results of the Gini coeﬃcient dynamics shown above.
While the trust decisions in EQ systematically aﬀect the wealth distribution
in the economy, this is not the case in IEQ.
The eﬀect of the repetition of the game (Run) is positive and corresponds
to an increase of average send rates across the treatments in the second run
16of the game. With respect to the evolution of investments over time, we
ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of the number of rounds for treatment EQ, whereas in
IEQ the eﬀect of time is somewhat mitigated. This result is in line with the
reported matching group averages. Finally, the coeﬃcient of the treatment
dummy is large and highly signiﬁcant, pointing out a negative eﬀect of initial
inequality introduced by the variation of endowments.
The model for responder decisions indicates that return rates are gener-
ally higher in treatment IEQ, and shrink over time. We ﬁnd that participants
reciprocate high investments, as the coeﬃcient for the send rate is positive
and signiﬁcant: The more of his wealth the ﬁrst mover sends, the higher
his expected proﬁt margin. Rich senders can expect to earn less from their
trusting decisions than poor senders, while there seems to be no eﬀect of the
wealth of the responder herself. Also, there are no signiﬁcant interaction
eﬀects between treatment and the relative wealth indicators as found in the
send rate regression.
V Discussion and Conclusions
We have conducted an experimental trust game to analyze the dynamics of
economic inequality and trust. In our experimental economies, participants
start with either an equal or unequal endowment distribution. They then
repeatedly play a trust game and accumulate their payoﬀs. In each round,
both transaction partners are informed about the current wealth of their
opponent.
We ﬁnd that trust and eﬃciency is initially high in the economy starting
with equal endowments (EQ), but decreases over time; when endowments are
unequal (IEQ), trust is initially lower yet remains relatively stable. While
wealth distributions converge towards each other, IEQ eventually outper-
forms the initially equal economy EQ. The diﬀerences seem partly due to
the fact that conditional trust is much more prevalent in EQ than in IEQ.
Two explanations for the diﬀerent role of conditional behavior across treat-
ments suggest themselves.
17First, wealth might be a credible signal for trustworthiness: unfair agents
become richer, and therefore richer people should be trusted less. However,
in IEQ wealth information has less reputational value, because there wealth
does not only depend on behavior but also on the exogenous endowments.17
This implies that there is more reason to employ conditional trust strategies
in EQ than in IEQ.
Second, social preferences may also produce conditional behaviors in
EQ. Observe that, as trustees typically do not return more than what the
trustor has sent, higher send amounts tend to yield more inequality when
the responder is rich, and less inequality when the responder is poor. Thus,
inequality aversion in treatment EQ might prevent participants from sending
their money to rich responders. This hinders growth. But then, why don’t
we see the same mechanism in treatment IEQ?
We suspect that the answer to this question lies in the way inequality
was created. A number of experimental studies (see for example Bolton,
Brandts and Ockenfels (2005), Frey, Benz and Stutzer (2004)) emphasize
the role of procedural fairness for economic decision-making. People are
found to be more tolerant towards inequitable outcomes if inequality is the
result of a fair procedure. This is the case in treatment IEQ in the sense that
the assignment of initial endowments is done by a ’fair’ chance move such
that the initial distribution may be perceived as fair by the participants.
Contrary, inequality emerging in treatment EQ is created endogenously by
unfair behavior of some of the subjects and thus triggers inequality averse
behavior of others. Summing up, inequality aversion seems to have coun-
terintuitive eﬀects in our experiment: it lowers the economy’s potential to
grow when starting with equality, and does not trigger redistribution when
inequality is imposed by an exogenous and fair procedure.18
17In our regressions, we do not ﬁnd a direct signiﬁcant eﬀect of a responder’s wealth
on her return rate. However, the eﬀect may be concealed to some extent, because if the
argument is right, rich people are trusted less and thus earn less.
18One puzzle remains: why, if inequality aversion plays a role, are send rates lower with
higher sender wealth? There are three potential explanations: First, as the regressions
show, rich senders run a higher risk of being exploited than poor subjects, and therefore
should be more cautious. Second, for the same send rate, rich senders put considerably
more money on the table than poor senders. And third, inequality aversion is generally
18Of course, a similar pattern of conditional trust may also emerge from
reciprocity. Indeed, high wealth in EQ is a signal for prior unfair behavior;
simple correlation analysis reveals that in treatment EQ there is a signiﬁ-
cant negative correlation between a person’s wealth at the end of a half-run
and her average return rate in the preceding periods.19 These subjects are
also less trusting.20 Thus, negative reciprocity based on wealth signals is
justiﬁed in treatment EQ. Contrary, in treatment IEQ the informational
content of wealth is covered by the exogenous imposed inequality. Corre-
spondingly, half-run correlations between average return rates and wealth
are low or insigniﬁcant here.21 Thus, participants behave negatively re-
ciprocal in treatment EQ on the basis of wealth levels, thereby hampering
exchange and growth. In treatment IEQ, such conditional behavior is not
feasible due to the ex-ante heterogeneity in wealth levels, endorsing trust,
somewhat surprisingly.
Overall, the following picture emerges from our analyses: in the exper-
imental EQ economy, trust is relatively prevalent at the beginning, maybe
due to low social distance as measured by initial wealth comparisons. Send-
ing money increases eﬃciency and rises accumulated wealth, but also nec-
essarily yields some inequality. This results from the stochastic matching
and role assignment on the one hand and from behavioral heterogeneity
among subjects on the other hand. In fact, the diﬀerence between simu-
lated and actual Gini values makes obvious that heterogeneity in trust and
trustworthiness drives a non-trivial part of the increasing inequality in EQ.
With increasing inequality, subjects start to condition their behavior on the
opponent’s wealth, motivated by inequality aversion, reciprocity or reputa-
assumed to be asymmetric with respect to own disadvantage and advantage.
19Results of Pearson correlations in treatment EQ are R=-.358, p=.004 and R=-.479,
p=.000 for rounds 1-10 and rounds 11-20 in run 1, and R=-.397, p=.001 and R=-.309,
p=.013 for rounds 1-10 and rounds 11-20 in run 2, respectively.
20Average trust and trustworthiness of a subject are generally highly correlated (treat-
ment EQ: R=.592, p=.000 and R=.526, p=.000 for run 1 and 2, treatment IEQ: R=.526,
p=.000 and R=.371, p=.000 for run 1 and 2, respectively), but the correlations are some-
what stronger in treatment EQ.
21In treatment IEQ Pearson correlation statistics are R=-.142, p=.262 and R=-.048,
p=.704 for rounds 1-10 and rounds 11-20 in run 1, and R=-.240, p=.056 and R=-.152,
p=.231 for rounds 1-10 and rounds 11-20 in run 2, respectively.
19tional eﬀects. Rich subjects do not trust poor subjects because of the risk of
being exploited, and nobody trusts rich subjects, unable to distinguish be-
tween riches who made their fortune in a fair way and the ones who exploited
others. Consequently, trust rates go down and growth is attenuated.
The situation is very diﬀerent in the experimental IEQ economy: Initial
exogenous inequality lowers mutual trust, but send rates are still positive.
Inequality decreases over time, but not because of deliberate redistribu-
tion from rich to poor. Of course there is heterogeneity in behavior,22
but (at least senders’ behavior) is not systematically aﬀected by wealth
levels. The initial fairly assigned endowment diﬀerences do not allow for
fairness/reputation eﬀects of accumulated income. As a result, trust levels
remain stable, allowing for considerable eﬃciency gains until the end of the
game.
We believe that our study yields promising questions for further research.
On the individual level, further experimental work is needed to distinguish
between alternative motives for the conditional behavior observed in treat-
ment EQ. On the aggregate level, it might be worth studying experimental
economies starting with more realistically unequal or asymmetric initial in-
come distributions. The experimental economies studied here start with
symmetric income distributions with a Gini factor of 0 and 0.30, respec-
tively. However, the lowest Gini ever measured was 0.16 in Bulgaria, 1968,
and the highest was 0.74 in Namibia, 1993. In 2000 the Gini for the United
States was 0.41, and 0.28 for Germany.
Finally, while most existing empirical studies of the relationship between
inequality, trust and macroeconomic indicators concentrate on cross-country
correlations, our results suggest that there might also be value in studying
the dynamics of inequality within countries – as well as the interaction of
trust and procedural or jurisdictional fairness perceptions.
22For example, 30 % of the subjects have an average send rate of less than 0.25, while
approximately 35 % of the subjects send more than 75% of their respective round wealth.
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Regressions of individual send and return quotas, including
2-factorial set of independent interaction effects
Dependent Variable Send Rate Return Rate
Coeﬃcients (Std.Error) Coeﬃcients (Std.Error)
Round -0.012* (0.005) -0.011* (0.005)
WSDR -0.375** (0.076) -0.239** (0.072)
WSDR*Round 0.000 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003)
WRSPR -0.243** (0.065) 0.010 (0.082)
WRSPR*Round -0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003)
WRSPR*WSDR 0.069* (0.035) 0.067 (0.037)
Treatment -0.629** (0.130) 0.075 (0.099)
Treatment*Round 0.013** (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
Treatment*WSDR 0.308** (0.065) 0.063 (0.047)
Treatment*WRSPR 0.253** (0.043) -0.058 (0.062)
Run 0.120* (0.056) 0.065 (0.063)
Run*Round -0.003 (0.002) -0.006** (0.002)
Run*WSDR 0.025 (0.033) -0.027 (0.033)
Run*WRSPR -0.082* (0.032) 0.076* (0.032)
Run*Treatment 0.014 (0.022) -0.059** (0.021)
Send rate 0.293** (0.074)
Send rate*Round -0.003 (0.002)
Send rate*WSDR -0.013 (0.040)
Send rate*WRSPR -0.095* (0.046)
Send rate*Treatment 0.039 (0.031)
Send rate*Run -.0.038 (0.027)
Constant 1.190** (0.123) 0.330** (0.120)
Random Eﬀects
Group StdDev 0.171 (0.040) 0.000 (0.000)
Subject StdDev 0.265 (0.019) 0.173 (0.012)
Residual StdDev 0.272 (0.004) 0.243 (0.017)
No. of obs. 2554 2246
Wald χ2 301.43 299.70
Log-restricted likelihood -500.302 -155.981
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * and ** denote signiﬁcance on the 5% and 1%-level,
respectively.
24B Instructions
Below we show the instructions, translated from German, for the ﬁrst run of
treatment IEQ. Instructions for the other runs and treatments were worded
in a similar way.
Welcome! You can earn money in this experiment. How much money you
earn depends on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants.
From now on, please do not communicate with the other participants. If
you have a question concerning the experiment, please raise your hand! We
will come over to you to answer your question. If you break this rule, we
will have to exclude you from the experiment and all payments.
In the experiment, we will use “Experiment-Taler” (ET) as the currency.
At the end of the experiment, your payoﬀ will be converted into Euros and
will be paid out in cash. The exchange rate is 150 ET = 1 Euro. In the
experiment, all amounts in ET are rounded to whole numbers.
The experiment consists of several runs. The payoﬀ of one of these runs will
be paid out at the end of the experiment. After the experiment is over, it
will be determined by the roll of a die which run is relevant for the payment.
The following instructions refer to the ﬁrst run of the experiment. After the
ﬁrst run is over you will receive new instructions.
In this run all participants receive an initial endowment. Half of the par-
ticipants receive an initial endowment of 800 ET, the other half receives
an initial endowment of 200 ET. It will be determined by chance which
participant receives which initial endowment.
The run consists of 20 rounds. In each round pairs are formed randomly,
each pair consisting of participant A and participant B. It is guaranteed that
you do not interact with the same participant in two subsequent rounds. The
roles A and B within the group are assigned randomly in every round. The
identity of the participant you are interacting with is secret, and no other
participant will be informed about your identity. Thus, your decisions are
anonymous.
Every round proceeds as follows:
25• At the beginning of the round both participants are informed about
their roles (A or B), about the number of the round (1-20), their own
current wealth and the current wealth of the other participant.
• Then participant A can decide how much of his/her wealth he/she
wants to send to participant B.
• The amount sent by participant A is multiplied by 1.2. This means
participant B not only receives the amount sent, but 120 % of the
amount sent (1.2*amount sent).
• Then participant B can decide how much he/she sends back to par-
ticipant A. He/she must send back at least 90 % of the amount sent
(0.9*amount sent). The upper limit for the amount sent back is the
wealth of participant B.
After that the round is over. Wealth at the end of the round is calculated
as follows:
• Participant A: Wealth at the end of the round = wealth at the be-
ginning of the round - amount sent + amount sent back (at least
0.9*amount sent)
• Participant B: Wealth at the end of the round = wealth at the be-
ginning of the round + 1.2*amount sent - amount sent back (at least
0.9*amount sent)
Wealth at the beginning of a new round is equal to wealth at the end of the
preceding round. The relevant payment for the run is determined by the
wealth at the end of the last round in the run.
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